Matching with externalities

Arbeitspapier

We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we extend the standard insights of matching theory, like the existence of side-optimal stable matchings and the deferred acceptance algorithm, to settings with externalities even though the standard fixed-point techniques do not apply.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 392

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Market Design ; General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: General ; Externalities ; Economics of Contract: Theory
• Thema: Matching ; externalities ; two-sided matching ; matching with contracts ; stable matching ; labor markets ; deferred acceptance ; substitutes

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Pycia, Marek ; Yenmez, M. Bumin
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Zurich, Department of Economics
• (wo): Zurich
• (wann): 2021

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5167/uzh-204367
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/235605
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ