Sequencing bilateral negotiations with externalities

Arbeitspapier

We show that financial advisors recommend more costly products to female clients, based on minutes from about 27,000 real-world advisory meetings and client portfolio data. Funds recommended to women have higher expense ratios controlling for risk, and women less often receive rebates on upfront fees for any given fund. We develop a model relating these findings to client stereotyping, and empirically verify an additional prediction: Women (but not men) with higher financial aptitude reject recommendations more frequently. Women state a preference for delegating financial decisions, but appear unaware of associated higher costs. Evidence of stereotyping is stronger for male advisors.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 096

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Externalities ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
• Subject: bargaining power ; sequential negotiations ; externalities ; bilateral contracting ; endogenous timing

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Münster, Johannes ; Reisinger, Markus
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
• (where): Bonn and Cologne
• (when): 2021

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/237341
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET