Arbeitspapier
Three economist's tools for antitrust and merger analysis: Case applications
This paper presents a non-technical introduction to three economic tools that have in recent years become widespread in competition law enforcement in general and in the analysis of proposed mergers in particular: critical loss analysis, upward pricing pressure, and the vertical arithmetic. In addition, for each tool, its use in a recent U.S. merger case is illustrated: for critical loss analysis, the Novelis/Aleris merger; for upward pricing pressure, the GE/Electrolux merger; and for the vertical arithmetic, the Comcast/NBCU joint venture.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: EAG Discussion Paper ; No. EAG 21-2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Merger enforcement
Critical loss analysis
Upward pricing pressure
Vertical arithmetic
Horizontal mergers
Vertical mergers
Antitrust economics
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Pittman, Russell W.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG)
- (wo)
-
Washington, DC
- (wann)
-
2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Pittman, Russell W.
- U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG)
Entstanden
- 2021
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