Artikel
Effective European Antitrust : Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence?
We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990–2009 period. Our empirical results suggest phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as - unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions - phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries, that is, industries where the Herfindahl Hirschman Index is above the 0.2 cut-off level employed by the EC. Additionally, we find phase-1 remedies do not deter clearly pro-competitive mergers, but do deter potentially anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Economic Inquiry ; ISSN: 1465-7295 ; Volume: 54 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1884-1903 ; Hoboken: Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Clougherty, Joseph A.
Duso, Tomaso
Lee, Miyu
Seldeslachts, Jo
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
- (wo)
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Hoboken
- (wann)
-
2016
- DOI
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doi:10.1111/ecin.12346
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Clougherty, Joseph A.
- Duso, Tomaso
- Lee, Miyu
- Seldeslachts, Jo
- Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
- ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Entstanden
- 2016
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