Arbeitspapier
Effective European antitrust: Does EC merger policy generate deterrence?
We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our empirical results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as - unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions - phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries; i.e., industries where the HHI is above the 0.2 cut-off level employed by the EC. Additionally, we find that phase-1 remedies do not deter clearly pro-competitive mergers, but do deter potentially anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1523
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Antitrust Law
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
- Thema
-
merger
deterrence
European Commission
merger policy
competition policy
antitrust
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Clougherty, Joseph
Duso, Tomaso
Lee, Miyu
Seldeslachts, Jo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Clougherty, Joseph
- Duso, Tomaso
- Lee, Miyu
- Seldeslachts, Jo
- Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
Entstanden
- 2015