Effective European antitrust: Does EC merger policy generate deterrence?

Arbeitspapier

We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our empirical results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as - unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions - phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries; i.e., industries where the HHI is above the 0.2 cut-off level employed by the EC. Additionally, we find that phase-1 remedies do not deter clearly pro-competitive mergers, but do deter potentially anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1523

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Antitrust Law ; Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
• Subject: merger ; deterrence ; European Commission ; merger policy ; competition policy ; antitrust

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Clougherty, Joseph ; Duso, Tomaso ; Lee, Miyu ; Seldeslachts, Jo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125155
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET