Strategic use of environmental information

Arbeitspapier

Strategic use of environmental information may have as consequence that a benevolent environmental agency will choose not to disclose information leading to reduced moral motivation. Thus, decision makers will not have access to such information, implying that they will not be able to adjust their decisions to available information on the state of the environment. In contrast, if the benevolent environmental agency instead bases its regulation on standard economic instruments, these instruments will incorporate all available information.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Memorandum ; No. 2009,21

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Consumer Economics: Theory ; Public Goods
• Subject: Environmental regulation ; voluntary contributions ; moral motivation ; hard information ; Umweltauflage ; Informationsmanagement ; Ethik ; Motivation ; Wohlfahrtseffekt ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Asheim, Geir B.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Oslo, Department of Economics
• (where): Oslo
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47352
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET