Arbeitspapier
Strategic use of environmental information
Strategic use of environmental information may have as consequence that a benevolent environmental agency will choose not to disclose information leading to reduced moral motivation. Thus, decision makers will not have access to such information, implying that they will not be able to adjust their decisions to available information on the state of the environment. In contrast, if the benevolent environmental agency instead bases its regulation on standard economic instruments, these instruments will incorporate all available information.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Memorandum ; No. 2009,21
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Consumer Economics: Theory
Public Goods
- Thema
-
Environmental regulation
voluntary contributions
moral motivation
hard information
Umweltauflage
Informationsmanagement
Ethik
Motivation
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Asheim, Geir B.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Oslo
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Asheim, Geir B.
- University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2009