Arbeitspapier
The strategic use of ambiguity
Ambiguity can be used as a strategic device in some situations. To demonstrate this, we propose and study a framework for normal form games where players can use Knightian uncertainty strategically. In such Ellsberg games, players may use Ellsberg urns in addition to the standard objective mixed strategies. We assume that players are ambiguity-averse in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler. While classical Nash equilibria remain equilibria in the new game, there arise new Ellsberg equilibria that can be quite different from Nash equilibria. A negotiation game with three players illustrates this finding. Another class of examples shows the use of ambiguity in mediation. We also highlight some conceptually interesting properties of Ellsberg equilibria in two person games with conflicting interests.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Papers ; No. 452
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Verhandlungstheorie
Spieltheorie
Risiko
Gleichgewicht
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Riedel, Frank
Sass, Linda
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
- (where)
-
Bielefeld
- (when)
-
2011
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Riedel, Frank
- Sass, Linda
- Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Time of origin
- 2011
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