Committee Search with Ex-ante Heterogeneous Agents: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Arbeitspapier

The paper develops a committee search model with ex-ante heterogeneous agents and designs laboratory experiments to test theoretical predictions. In the theoretical part of the study, there exists one and only one pivotal voter, who can perfectly and dominantly control the voting results of the committee search activities. The most important prediction is that nonpivotal voters become less picky in committee search than in single-agent search, but that a pivotal voter's voting behavior remains unchanged, regardless of the type of voting rules for the search. However, our experimental results did not support this prediction; not only the nonpivotal voters but also the pivotal voter became less picky in the committee search games. In addition, we found gender differences in voting behavior; females show more concern for other group members' payoff as well as themselves than do males.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 10760

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: experiments ; committee search ; plurality voting rules

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Inukai, Keigo ; Kawata, Keisuke ; Sasaki, Masaru
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/161383
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET