Arbeitspapier
In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents
This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The experimental design extends the Bala-Goyal (2000) model of network formation with decay and two-way flow of benefits by allowing for agents with lower linking costs or higher benefits to others. Furthermore, agents types may be common knowledge or private information. In all treatments, the (efficient) equilibrium network has a star structure. With homogeneous agents, equilibrium predictions fail completely. In contrast, with heterogeneous agents stars frequently occur, often with the high-value or low-cost agent in the center. Stars are not born but rather develop: with a high-value agent, the networks centrality, stability, and efficiency all increase over time. Probit estimations based on best-response behaviour and other-regarding preferences are used to analyze individual linking behavior. Our results suggest that heterogeneity is a major determinant for the predominance of star-like structures in real-life social networks.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 65.2007
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
- Thema
-
Network Formation
Experiment
Heterogeneity
Private Information
Netzwerk
Soziales Netzwerk
Test
Asymmetrische Information
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ule, Alja
Goeree, Jacob K.
Riedl, Arno
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:24 MESZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ule, Alja
- Goeree, Jacob K.
- Riedl, Arno
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2007
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Social (In)Stability, Distributive Conflicts, and Investment in Poor and Rich Economies
Wage bargaining and management opposition in the presence of productivity gains and organization costs
Behavioral and experimental economics can inform public policy: some thoughts
Weakening the weak may harm the strong: A bargaining model where opting-in is costly
Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations
Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations
In search of stars: network formation among heterogeneous agents
Moral Property Rights in Bargaining
Experimental labor markets and policy considerations: Incomplete contracts and macroeconomic aspects
Tax Liability Side Equivalence in Gift-Exchange Labor Markets
Input versus Output Taxation in an Experimental International Economy
Dividing justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims
Social (In)Stability, Distributive Conflicts, and Investment in Poor and Rich Economies
Wage bargaining and management opposition in the presence of productivity gains and organization costs
Behavioral and experimental economics can inform public policy: some thoughts
Weakening the weak may harm the strong: A bargaining model where opting-in is costly
Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations
Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations
In search of stars: network formation among heterogeneous agents
Moral Property Rights in Bargaining
Experimental labor markets and policy considerations: Incomplete contracts and macroeconomic aspects
Tax Liability Side Equivalence in Gift-Exchange Labor Markets
Input versus Output Taxation in an Experimental International Economy
Dividing justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims
Social (In)Stability, Distributive Conflicts, and Investment in Poor and Rich Economies
Wage bargaining and management opposition in the presence of productivity gains and organization costs
Behavioral and experimental economics can inform public policy: some thoughts
Weakening the weak may harm the strong: A bargaining model where opting-in is costly
Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations
Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations
In search of stars: network formation among heterogeneous agents
Moral Property Rights in Bargaining
Experimental labor markets and policy considerations: Incomplete contracts and macroeconomic aspects
Tax Liability Side Equivalence in Gift-Exchange Labor Markets
Input versus Output Taxation in an Experimental International Economy