Arbeitspapier

Nash Networks with Heterogeneous Agents

A non-cooperative model of network formation is developed. Agents form links with others based on the cost of the link and its assessed benefit. Link formation is one-sided, i.e., agents can initiate links with other agents without their consent, provided the agent forming the link makes the appropriate investment. Information flow is two-way. The model builds on the work of Bala and Goyal, but allows for agent heterogeneity. Whereas they permit links to fail with a certain common probability, in our model the probability of failure can be different for different links. We investigate Nash networks that exhibit connectedness and super-connectedness. We provide an explicit characterization of certain star networks. Efficiency and Pareto-optimality issues are discussed through examples. We explore alternative model specifications to address potential shortcomings.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 337

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
Soziales Netzwerk
Informationsverbreitung
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Haller, Hans
Sarangi, Sudipta
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Haller, Hans
  • Sarangi, Sudipta
  • Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)

Entstanden

  • 2003

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