Arbeitspapier
Nash Networks with Heterogeneous Agents
A non-cooperative model of network formation is developed. Agents form links with others based on the cost of the link and its assessed benefit. Link formation is one-sided, i.e., agents can initiate links with other agents without their consent, provided the agent forming the link makes the appropriate investment. Information flow is two-way. The model builds on the work of Bala and Goyal, but allows for agent heterogeneity. Whereas they permit links to fail with a certain common probability, in our model the probability of failure can be different for different links. We investigate Nash networks that exhibit connectedness and super-connectedness. We provide an explicit characterization of certain star networks. Efficiency and Pareto-optimality issues are discussed through examples. We explore alternative model specifications to address potential shortcomings.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 337
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
Soziales Netzwerk
Informationsverbreitung
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Haller, Hans
Sarangi, Sudipta
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Haller, Hans
- Sarangi, Sudipta
- Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
Entstanden
- 2003