Supply chain dynamics with assortative matching

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies the evolutionarily stable strategies of one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chains. Each manufacturer and retailer chooses between two pure strategies of management: shareholder-oriented or stakeholder-oriented. Based on its management strategy, the firm decides its wholesale or retail price. In this paper, we consider supply chains formed by two matching processes: random matching and assortative matching. Our results indicate that random matching does not support interior Nash equilibria; the evolutionarily stable strategy is for both manufacturer and retailer to choose shareholder strategy. We extend Bergstrom (2003) to a two-population game, and compare the dynamics of supply chains under random matching and assortative matching. Interior Nash equilibrium is observed with assortative matching. However, this interior equilibrium is unstable. The four unique strategy profiles obtained by various combinations of the two strategy choices may be evolutionarily stable for certain values of the indices of assortativity.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 736

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Business Objectives of the Firm ; Firm Behavior: Theory
• Thema: Nash equilibrium ; assortative matching ; evolutionary stable strategy ; replicator equation

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Chai, Caichun ; Francis, Eilin ; Xiao, Tiaojun
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of California, Economics Department
• (wo): Santa Cruz, CA
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148107
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ