Latent indices in assortative matching models

Artikel

A large class of two-sided matching models that include both transferable and non-transferable utility result in positive assortative matching along a latent index. Data from matching markets, however, may not exhibit perfect assortativity due to the presence of unobserved characteristics. This paper studies the identification and estimation of such models. We show that the distribution of the latent index is not identified when data from one-to-one matches are observed. Remarkably, the model is nonparametrically identified using data in a single large market when each agent on one side has at least two matched partners. The additional empirical content in many-to-one matches is demonstrated using simulations and stylized examples. We then derive asymptotic properties of a minimum distance estimator as the size of the market increases, allowing estimation using dependent data from a single large matching market. The nature of the dependence requires modification of existing empirical process techniques to obtain a limit theorem.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Quantitative Economics ; ISSN: 1759-7331 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 685-728 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Model Construction and Estimation ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
• Thema: Matching ; identification ; estimation

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Diamond, William ; Agarwal, Nikhil
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The Econometric Society
• (wo): New Haven, CT
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3982/QE736
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/195552
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ