Career concerns incentives: an experimental test

Abstract: Holmström's (1982/99) career concerns model has become a workhorse for analyzing agency issues in many elds. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way, which is difficult to directly test with eld data: typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on. Our laboratory experiment provides prima facie evidence: i) the signal jamming mechanism successfully creates incentives on the labor supply side; ii) decision errors take time to decrease; iii) while subjects' average beliefs are remarkably consistent with play, a mild winner's curse arises on the labor demand side

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch
• Notes: Postprint ; begutachtet (peer reviewed) ; In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ; 72 (2009) 1 ; 571–588

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (where): Mannheim
• (when): 2009
• Creator: Koch, Alexander K. ; Morgenstern, Albrecht ; Raab, Philippe

Further information

• DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.014
• URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-293040
• Rights: Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 25.03.2025, 1:45 PM CET