Career concerns incentives: an experimental test
Abstract: Holmström's (1982/99) career concerns model has become a workhorse for analyzing agency issues in many elds. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way, which is difficult to directly test with eld data: typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on. Our laboratory experiment provides prima facie evidence: i) the signal jamming mechanism successfully creates incentives on the labor supply side; ii) decision errors take time to decrease; iii) while subjects' average beliefs are remarkably consistent with play, a mild winner's curse arises on the labor demand side
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
Postprint
begutachtet (peer reviewed)
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ; 72 (2009) 1 ; 571–588
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2009
- Urheber
- DOI
-
10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.014
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-293040
- Rechteinformation
-
Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
15.08.2025, 07:24 MESZ
Datenpartner
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Koch, Alexander K.
- Morgenstern, Albrecht
- Raab, Philippe
Entstanden
- 2009