Career concerns incentives: an experimental test

Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel

Holmström's (1982/99) career concerns model has become a workhorse for analyzing agency issues in many elds. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way, which is difficult to directly test with eld data: typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on. Our laboratory experiment provides prima facie evidence: i) the signal jamming mechanism successfully creates incentives on the labor supply side; ii) decision errors take time to decrease; iii) while subjects' average beliefs are remarkably consistent with play, a mild winner's curse arises on the labor demand side.

Object Details

• Extent: Seite(n): 571–588
• Language: Englisch
• Notes: Status: Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 72(1)

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
• Subject: Wirtschaft ; Allgemeines, spezielle Theorien und Schulen, Methoden, Entwicklung und Geschichte der Wirtschaftswissenschaften ; Reputation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Koch, Alexander K. ; Morgenstern, Albrecht ; Raab, Philippe
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (where): Niederlande
• (when): 2009

Further information

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.014
• URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-293040
• Rights: GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
• Last update: 21.06.2024, 4:26 PM CEST