Arbeitspapier

The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension

A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core.

Language: Englisch

Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 50.2003

Classification: Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games

Subject: Core
Non-emptiness
Indirect dominance
Outsider-independence
Spieltheorie
Core
Theorie

Event: Geistige Schöpfung

(who): Kóczy, László Á.
Lauwers, Luc

Event: Veröffentlichung

(who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

(where): Milano

(when): 2003

Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118082

Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

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Object type

Arbeitspapier

Associated

Kóczy, László Á.
Lauwers, Luc
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

2003

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Arbeitspapier