Arbeitspapier
The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension
A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 50.2003
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Thema
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Core
Non-emptiness
Indirect dominance
Outsider-independence
Spieltheorie
Core
Theorie
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kóczy, László Á.
Lauwers, Luc
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
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Milano
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kóczy, László Á.
- Lauwers, Luc
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2003