Arbeitspapier
The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core. We provide an algorithm to find the minimal dominant set.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2004/21
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
dynamic solution
absorbing set
core
non-emptiness
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Koczy, Laszlo A.
Lauwers, Luc
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Budapest
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Koczy, Laszlo A.
- Lauwers, Luc
- Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2004