Arbeitspapier

The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension

A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core. We provide an algorithm to find the minimal dominant set.

Language: Englisch

Bibliographic citation: Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2004/21

Classification: Wirtschaft

Subject: dynamic solution
absorbing set
core
non-emptiness

Event: Geistige Schöpfung

(who): Koczy, Laszlo A.
Lauwers, Luc

Event: Veröffentlichung

(who): Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics

(where): Budapest

(when): 2004

Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108061

Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

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Object type

Arbeitspapier

Associated

Koczy, Laszlo A.
Lauwers, Luc
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics

Time of origin

2004

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Arbeitspapier