Arbeitspapier
Technology adoption in markets with network effects: Theory and experimental evidence
We examine a technology adoption game with network effects in which coordination on technology A and technology B constitute a Nash equilibrium. Coordination on technology B is assumed to be payoff-dominant. We define a technology's critical mass as the minimum share of users necessary to make the choice of this technology a best response for any remaining user. We show that the technology with a lower critical mass is risk-dominant and is chosen by the maximin criterion. We present experimental evidence that both pay-off dominance and risk dominance explain participants' choices. The relative riskiness of a technology can be proxied using technologies' critical masses or stand-alone values.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 33
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- Subject
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Network Effects
Critical Mass
Coordination
Riskiness
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Keser, Claudia
Suleymanova, Irina
Wey, Christian
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (where)
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Düsseldorf
- (when)
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2011
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Keser, Claudia
- Suleymanova, Irina
- Wey, Christian
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Time of origin
- 2011
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Bertrand competition in markets with network effects and switching costs
Bertrand competition in markets with network effects and switching costs
On the role of consumer expectations in markets with network effects
On the (mis-) alignment of consumer and social welfare in markets with network effects
Technology adoption in critical mass games: theory and experimental evidence
Mergers in imperfectly segmented markets
Third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly when markets are covered
Third‐Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly when Markets are Covered
Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly When Markets Are Covered
Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly When Markets Are Covered
Neue Mindestlohngesetze vernichten Gewerkschaftskonkurrenz: Kommentar