Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly When Markets Are Covered

Arbeitspapier

We analyze oligopolistic third-degree price discrimination relative to uniform pricing when markets are always covered. Pricing equilibria are critically determined by supply-side features such as the number of firms and their marginal cost differences. It follows that each firm’s Lerner index under uniform pricing is equal to the weighted harmonic mean of the firm’s relative margins under discriminatory pricing. Uniform pricing then decreases average prices and raises consumer surplus. We provide an intriguingly simple approach to calculate the gain in consumer surplus and loss in firms’ profits from uniform pricing only based on market data of the discriminatory equilibrium (prices and quantities).

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8785

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Antitrust Law
• Thema: third-degree price discrimination ; oligopolistic competition ; market integration

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus ; Wey, Christian
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2020

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/229603
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ