Arbeitspapier
Pareto improvements by in-kind-transfers
This paper shows that in-kind-transfers are an effective instrument to stabilize agreements when compliance cannot be guaranteed. It demonstrates the weak superiority of in-kind-transfers for a unilateral relationship between two agents. In particular, it proves that, under conditions of perfect knowledge and necessary selfenforcement of contracts, both agents are at least not worse off by in-kind-transfers compared to monetary payments when no selfenforcing contract exists which,is based on monetary payments. This result holds for finitely and for infinitely repeated games.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Year: 1992 ; Kiel: Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Spieltheorie
Externer Effekt
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Stähler, Frank
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW)
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (where)
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Kiel
- (when)
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1992
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Stähler, Frank
- Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW)
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Time of origin
- 1992
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