Arbeitspapier

Saving Private Pareto

We include initial holdings in the jungle economy of Piccione and Rubinstein (Economic Journal, 2007) and relax the assumptions on consumption sets and preferences. We show that initial holdings are irrelevant for lexicographic welfare maximization. Equilibria other than such maximizers can be jungle equilibria due to myopia. We show that farsightedness restores the equivalence between jungle equilibria and lexicographic welfare maximization. However, we also derive farsighted equilibria in which stronger agents withhold goods from weaker agents. Then, gift giving by stronger agents is needed to restore Pareto efficiency. Our results add to understanding coercion and the crucial assumptions underlying jungle economies.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 13-053/II

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Exchange and Production Economies
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Comparative Studies of Particular Economies
Thema
jungle economy
withholding
coercion
power

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Houba, Harold
Luttens, Roland Iwan
Weikard, Hans-Peter
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Houba, Harold
  • Luttens, Roland Iwan
  • Weikard, Hans-Peter
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2013

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