Arbeitspapier

Saving Private Pareto

We include initial holdings in the jungle economy of Piccione and Rubinstein (Economic Journal, 2007) and relax the assumptions on consumption sets and preferences. We show that initial holdings are irrelevant for lexicographic welfare maximization. Equilibria other than such maximizers can be jungle equilibria due to myopia. We show that farsightedness restores the equivalence between jungle equilibria and lexicographic welfare maximization. However, we also derive farsighted equilibria in which stronger agents withhold goods from weaker agents. Then, gift giving by stronger agents is needed to restore Pareto efficiency. Our results add to understanding coercion and the crucial assumptions underlying jungle economies.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 13-053/II

Classification
Wirtschaft
Exchange and Production Economies
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Comparative Studies of Particular Economies
Subject
jungle economy
withholding
coercion
power

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Houba, Harold
Luttens, Roland Iwan
Weikard, Hans-Peter
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Houba, Harold
  • Luttens, Roland Iwan
  • Weikard, Hans-Peter
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2013

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