Arbeitspapier
Saving Private Pareto
We include initial holdings in the jungle economy of Piccione and Rubinstein (Economic Journal, 2007) and relax the assumptions on consumption sets and preferences. We show that initial holdings are irrelevant for lexicographic welfare maximization. Equilibria other than such maximizers can be jungle equilibria due to myopia. We show that farsightedness restores the equivalence between jungle equilibria and lexicographic welfare maximization. However, we also derive farsighted equilibria in which stronger agents withhold goods from weaker agents. Then, gift giving by stronger agents is needed to restore Pareto efficiency. Our results add to understanding coercion and the crucial assumptions underlying jungle economies.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 13-053/II
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Exchange and Production Economies
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Comparative Studies of Particular Economies
- Subject
-
jungle economy
withholding
coercion
power
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Houba, Harold
Luttens, Roland Iwan
Weikard, Hans-Peter
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2013
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Houba, Harold
- Luttens, Roland Iwan
- Weikard, Hans-Peter
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2013