Arbeitspapier
Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements?
Linking of repeated games and exchange of concessions in fields of relative strength may lead to more cooperation and to Pareto improvements relative to the situation where each game is played separately. In this paper we formalize these statements, provide some general results concerning the conditions for more cooperation and Pareto improvements to materialize or not and analyze the relation between both. Special attention is paid to the role of asymmetries.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 60.2007
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
Environmental Policy
Linking
Folk Theorem
Tensor Game
Prsioners' Dilemma
Full Cooperation
Pareto Efficiency
Minkowski Sum
Vector Maximum
Convex Analysis
Wiederholte Spiele
Umweltpolitik
Folk-Theorem
Gefangenendilemma
Pareto-Optimum
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
von Mouche, Pierre
Folmer, Henk
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- von Mouche, Pierre
- Folmer, Henk
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2007
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Pareto improvements by in-kind-transfers
Pareto improvements by in kind transfers
Pareto improvements by in-kind-transfers
Unilateral emission reductions can lead to Pareto improvements when adaptation to damages is possible
Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
Pareto improvements of Nash equilibria in differential games
Endowment redistribution and Pareto improvements in GEI economies
Pareto
Pareto
Pareto
Does indirect tax harmonization deliver pareto improvements in the presence of global public goods?
A Pareto-dominant clustering approach for Pareto-frontiers
Pareto improvements by in-kind-transfers
Pareto improvements by in kind transfers
Pareto improvements by in-kind-transfers
Unilateral emission reductions can lead to Pareto improvements when adaptation to damages is possible
Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
Pareto improvements of Nash equilibria in differential games
Endowment redistribution and Pareto improvements in GEI economies
Pareto
Pareto
Pareto
Does indirect tax harmonization deliver pareto improvements in the presence of global public goods?
A Pareto-dominant clustering approach for Pareto-frontiers
Pareto improvements by in-kind-transfers
Pareto improvements by in kind transfers
Pareto improvements by in-kind-transfers
Unilateral emission reductions can lead to Pareto improvements when adaptation to damages is possible
Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
Pareto improvements of Nash equilibria in differential games
Endowment redistribution and Pareto improvements in GEI economies
Pareto
Pareto
Pareto
Does indirect tax harmonization deliver pareto improvements in the presence of global public goods?