Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts

Arbeitspapier

We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and implementable (Theorems 1 and 3). Furthermore, any solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and monotonic is a supersolution of the stable correspondence (Theorem 2). In other words, the stable correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Papers ; No. 372

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Labor Contracts
• Subject: Matching with Contracts ; (Maskin) Monotonicity ; Nash implementation ; Stability ; Personalbeschaffung ; Arbeitsvertrag ; Nash-Gleichgewicht ; Gleichgewichtstheorie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Haake, Claus-Jochen ; Klaus, Bettina
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
• (where): Bielefeld
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43767
• URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-7662
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET