- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics ; 372
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Bielefeld
- (wer)
-
Universitätsbibliothek Bielefeld
- (wann)
-
2005
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-7662
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Haake, Claus-Jochen
- Klaus, Bettina
- Universitätsbibliothek Bielefeld
Entstanden
- 2005
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
Incomplete contracts and Nash implementation in the case of two agents
Repeated Nash implementation
Markets and contracts
Nash implementation with little communication
MEDIEVAL MATCHING MARKETS
Medieval matching markets
Market Structure and Matching with Contracts
Full-truthful implementation in Nash equilibria
Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
Incomplete contracts and Nash implementation in the case of two agents
Repeated Nash implementation
Markets and contracts
Nash implementation with little communication
MEDIEVAL MATCHING MARKETS
Medieval matching markets
Market Structure and Matching with Contracts
Full-truthful implementation in Nash equilibria
Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
Incomplete contracts and Nash implementation in the case of two agents
Repeated Nash implementation
Markets and contracts
Nash implementation with little communication
MEDIEVAL MATCHING MARKETS
Medieval matching markets
Market Structure and Matching with Contracts
Full-truthful implementation in Nash equilibria