Arbeitspapier
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a 'double stable' matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Papers ; No. 399
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Labor Contracts
- Thema
-
Matching with couples
(Maskin) monotonicity
Nash implementation
Stability
Weakly responsive preferences
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Haake, Claus-Jochen
Klaus, Bettina
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
- (wo)
-
Bielefeld
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-13473
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Haake, Claus-Jochen
- Klaus, Bettina
- Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Entstanden
- 2008