Arbeitspapier

Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a 'double stable' matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Papers ; No. 399

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Labor Contracts
Thema
Matching with couples
(Maskin) monotonicity
Nash implementation
Stability
Weakly responsive preferences

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Haake, Claus-Jochen
Klaus, Bettina
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
(wo)
Bielefeld
(wann)
2008

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-13473
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Haake, Claus-Jochen
  • Klaus, Bettina
  • Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)

Entstanden

  • 2008

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