Arbeitspapier
Licensing with free entry
We introduce a fairly general licensing model with an endogenous industry structure - in terms of number of active firms - and general licensing contracts. We show that when the patentee can employ contracts that can condition on market entry or price, it can implement an outcome that yields monopoly profits by awarding the license to a single firm. Furthermore, when the patentee can only use contracts based on the quantities of the licensees, it still captures the entire market via a single licensee, albeit not at the monopoly price. Commonly assumed two-part tariff contracts cannot duplicate this last outcome and yield lower profits. We discuss the welfare implications of various contractual schemes.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1812
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Rationing; Licensing
Property Law
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Business Objectives of the Firm
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- Thema
-
Patent licensing
free entry
quantity competition
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Doganoglu, Toker
Inceoglu, Firat
Muthers, Johannes
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Linz
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Doganoglu, Toker
- Inceoglu, Firat
- Muthers, Johannes
- Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2018
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