Arbeitspapier

Licensing interim R&D knowledge

This paper considers three firms that engage in an R&D contest to develop a new profitable technology. For a broad range of parameters, the firm that leads the contest (i.e., has the highest probability of success) is better-off licensing or selling its superior interim knowledge to one of the two lagging firms or to both rather than holding on to its lead. Although transferring interim R&D knowledge to the lagging firms erodes the technological lead of the leading firm, it allows it to extract rents from its rivals and can possibly create value by increasing the chance that the licensee(s) will develop the new technology when the leading firm fails.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CSIO Working Paper ; No. 0088

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Rationing; Licensing
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Thema
Interim R&D knowledge
exclusive and nonexclusive licensing
transfer of knowledge
cross-licensing
Innovationswettbewerb
Lizenzvergabe
Wissenstransfer

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Spiegel, Yossi
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO)
(wo)
Evanston, IL
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Spiegel, Yossi
  • Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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