Hold-up Problems with Respect to R&D Investment and Licensing in Environmental Regulation

Arbeitspapier

We explore the design of self-financing tax-subsidy schemes to solve hold-up problems in environmental regulation. The announcement of the tax rate seems to be preferable to solve hold-up problems with respect to the investment in environmental R&D. In contrast, only the announcement of the subsidy rate is adequate to solve hold-up problems with respect to the licensing of environmentally friendly technologies. Altogether, the announcement of the subsidy rate yields higher expected social welfare than the announcement of the tax rate or the standard emission taxation if the marginal damage of emissions exceeds a certain level.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 05-86

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy ; Regulation and Industrial Policy: General ; Externalities
• Subject: Hold-up problems ; Environmental regulation ; Taxes and subsidies ; Selffinancing mechanisms ; Emission control ; Umweltpolitik ; Umweltschutzinvestition ; Sunk Costs ; Investition ; Umweltökonomik ; Ökonomischer Anreiz ; Duopol ; Oligopol ; Wohlfahrtseffekt ; Theorie ; Industrielle Forschung ; hold-up

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Breitscheidel, Jörg
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• (where): Mannheim
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24182
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET