Arbeitspapier

Government guarantees and financial stability

Banks are intrinsically fragile because of their role as liquidity providers. This results in under-provision of liquidity. We analyze the effect of government guarantees on the interconnection between banks' liquidity creation and likelihood of runs in a model of global games, where banks.and depositors' behavior are endogenous and affected by the amount and form of guarantee. The main insight of our analysis is that guarantees are welfare improving because they induce banks to improve liquidity provision although in a way that sometimes increases the likelihood of runs or creates distortions in banks' behavior.

ISBN
978-92-899-2754-3
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 2032

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
panic runs
fundamental runs
government guarantees
bank moral hazard

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Allen, Franklin
Carletti, Elena
Goldstein, Itay
Leonello, Agnese
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2017

DOI
doi:10.2866/46276
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Allen, Franklin
  • Carletti, Elena
  • Goldstein, Itay
  • Leonello, Agnese
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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