Arbeitspapier

Implicit government guarantees and bank herding behavior

During the past two decades 130 of the 182 IMF member countries have experienced serious problems in their banking sectors or an outright banking crisis. Among the stylized facts about these crises are their often systemic nature, a pronounced boom-bust cyde and substantial financial involvement by the government in the resolution process. This paper tries to tie these features together in a model of banks' herding behavior. Most existing models of herding behavior can explain the similarity of actions taken by different agents but do not necessarily imply excessive riskiness of these actions. On the other hand, many models that try to explain excessive risk-taking do not contain any incentive for herding. This paper develops astate-preference model of simultaneous herding and excessive risktaking. Thus, the model can help in understanding the frequency as weIl as the systemic nature ofbanking crises ...

ISBN
3933747260
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1999,06

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Bankenkrise
Gläubigerschutz
Moral Hazard
Bankrisiko
Investitionsentscheidung
Einlagensicherung
Theorie
Finanzkrise
Herdenverhalten

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Rüffer, Rasmus
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Deutsche Bundesbank
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
1999

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Rüffer, Rasmus
  • Deutsche Bundesbank

Entstanden

  • 1999

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