Arbeitspapier
Taxing deficits to restrain government spending and foster capital accumulation
In a dynamic model of fiscal policy, social polarization provokes a deficit bias. Policy advisors have recently proposed that governments running a deficit should be forced to generate additional tax revenue. We show that this deficit taxation reduces the deficit bias as it internalizes the externality different lobby groups impose on others. The mechanism described here is not due to the political risk of being elected out of office because the private sector dislikes taxation. Lower government spending and the resulting reduced deficit bias augment capital accumulation.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Discussion Paper Series 1 ; No. 2007,26
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Fiscal Policy
National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
National Deficit; Surplus
National Budget; Budget Systems
- Thema
-
fiscal rules
deficit taxation
polarization
capital accumulation
Finanzpolitik
Haushaltsdefizit
Steuerpolitik
Externer Effekt
Investition
Theorie
common pool problem
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Stähler, Nikolai
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Deutsche Bundesbank
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Stähler, Nikolai
- Deutsche Bundesbank
Entstanden
- 2007