Arbeitspapier

Cybersecurity and financial stability

Cyber attacks can impair banks operations and precipitate bank runs. When digital infrastructure is shared, banks defend themselves by investing in cybersecurity but can free-ride on the security measures of others. Ex ante free-riding by banks interacts with the ex post coordination frictions underpinning bank runs. While the temptation to free-ride induces underinvestment in cybersecurity, the prospect of a run encourages greater investment. System-wide cybersecurity is suboptimal and sensitive to rollover risk and bank heterogeneity. Regulatory measures, including negligence rules, liquidity regulation and cyber hygiene notices, facilitate constrained efficient cybersecurity investment. We suggest testable hypotheses to inform empirical work in this area.

ISBN
978-3-95729-876-8
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper ; No. 08/2022

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financial Crises
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Public Goods
Thema
cyber attacks
bank runs
global games
weaker-link public goods

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Anand, Kartik
Duley, Chanelle
Gai, Prasanna
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Deutsche Bundesbank
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Anand, Kartik
  • Duley, Chanelle
  • Gai, Prasanna
  • Deutsche Bundesbank

Entstanden

  • 2022

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