Arbeitspapier
Cybersecurity and financial stability
Cyber attacks can impair banks operations and precipitate bank runs. When digital infrastructure is shared, banks defend themselves by investing in cybersecurity but can free-ride on the security measures of others. Ex ante free-riding by banks interacts with the ex post coordination frictions underpinning bank runs. While the temptation to free-ride induces underinvestment in cybersecurity, the prospect of a run encourages greater investment. System-wide cybersecurity is suboptimal and sensitive to rollover risk and bank heterogeneity. Regulatory measures, including negligence rules, liquidity regulation and cyber hygiene notices, facilitate constrained efficient cybersecurity investment. We suggest testable hypotheses to inform empirical work in this area.
- ISBN
-
978-3-95729-876-8
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper ; No. 08/2022
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Financial Crises
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Public Goods
- Thema
-
cyber attacks
bank runs
global games
weaker-link public goods
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Anand, Kartik
Duley, Chanelle
Gai, Prasanna
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Deutsche Bundesbank
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Anand, Kartik
- Duley, Chanelle
- Gai, Prasanna
- Deutsche Bundesbank
Entstanden
- 2022