Arbeitspapier
A "wreckers theory" of financial distress
In recent years, a number of papers have established a new empirical regularity. Stocks of distressed firms vastly underperform those of financially healthy firms. It is not necessary to attribute the negative excess returns of distressed firms to inefficient or irrational markets. We show that negative excess returns are the equilibrium outcome when a subset of participants is able to draw returns "in kind" from distressed companies. For firms close to bankruptcy, non-cash returns to ownership will be the dominant form of return to equity. If markets expect a contest for control, these returns will show up in stock valuation. The governance problem described here creates a link between the financial position of a firm and real allocation that may amplify macroeconomic real or financial shocks.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper Series 1 ; No. 2005,40
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Bankruptcy; Liquidation
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
- Thema
-
stock market anomalies
default risk
private benefits
moral hazard
limited liability
Krisenmanagement
Zahlungsunfähigkeit
Börsenkurs
Kapitalertrag
Kreditrisiko
Moral Hazard
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
von Kalckreuth, Ulf
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Deutsche Bundesbank
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- von Kalckreuth, Ulf
- Deutsche Bundesbank
Entstanden
- 2005