Arbeitspapier

A "wreckers theory" of financial distress

In recent years, a number of papers have established a new empirical regularity. Stocks of distressed firms vastly underperform those of financially healthy firms. It is not necessary to attribute the negative excess returns of distressed firms to inefficient or irrational markets. We show that negative excess returns are the equilibrium outcome when a subset of participants is able to draw returns "in kind" from distressed companies. For firms close to bankruptcy, non-cash returns to ownership will be the dominant form of return to equity. If markets expect a contest for control, these returns will show up in stock valuation. The governance problem described here creates a link between the financial position of a firm and real allocation that may amplify macroeconomic real or financial shocks.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper Series 1 ; No. 2005,40

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Bankruptcy; Liquidation
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Thema
stock market anomalies
default risk
private benefits
moral hazard
limited liability
Krisenmanagement
Zahlungsunfähigkeit
Börsenkurs
Kapitalertrag
Kreditrisiko
Moral Hazard
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
von Kalckreuth, Ulf
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Deutsche Bundesbank
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • von Kalckreuth, Ulf
  • Deutsche Bundesbank

Entstanden

  • 2005

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