The rule of law and sustainability of the constitution: the case of tax evasion

Abstract: Why do rulers play by the rules? We show that the legality requirement under the rule of law implements an endogenous enforcement mechanism supporting constitutionality. Agents which do not obey unconstitutional legal norms are not sanctioned under constitutional rule. A principal who defects from the constitution but cannot commit himself to never reinstall the constitution finds law enforcement more difficult. As more agents disobey, enforcement becomes less effective. The expectation of an eventual return to constitutionality becomes self-fulfilling. We show this mechanism to be effective in deterring a government from violating constitutional norms

Standort
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Umfang
Online-Ressource
Sprache
Englisch

Klassifikation
Recht

Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wo)
Freiburg
(wer)
Universität
(wann)
2024
Urheber

DOI
10.6094/GWP/2012-01
URN
urn:nbn:de:bsz:25-freidok-2494799
Rechteinformation
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Letzte Aktualisierung
14.08.2025, 10:47 MESZ

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  • 2024

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