Worker Training and Quality Competition

Arbeitspapier

We uniquely examine the relationship between firm-sponsored training and product quality competition. Using an oligopolistic model of both price and quality competition, we show that an increase in the sensitivity of demand to product quality will strengthen firms’ incentives to train their workforce. Cross section, panel and instrumental variable estimations confirm that British establishments provide more intensive training when their competitive position is more sensitive to product quality. A variety of robustness checks and changes in variable definitions leave this confirmation in place.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: GLO Discussion Paper ; No. 137

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; Personnel Economics: Training
• Subject: Training ; Product Quality ; Demand Sensitivity ; Competition

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bilanakosa, Christos ; Heywood, John S. ; Sessions, John ; Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Global Labor Organization (GLO)
• (where): Maastricht
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/170708
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET