Arbeitspapier
Worker Training and Quality Competition
We uniquely examine the relationship between firm-sponsored training and product quality competition. Using an oligopolistic model of both price and quality competition, we show that an increase in the sensitivity of demand to product quality will strengthen firms’ incentives to train their workforce. Cross section, panel and instrumental variable estimations confirm that British establishments provide more intensive training when their competitive position is more sensitive to product quality. A variety of robustness checks and changes in variable definitions leave this confirmation in place.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: GLO Discussion Paper ; No. 137
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Personnel Economics: Training
- Thema
-
Training
Product Quality
Demand Sensitivity
Competition
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bilanakosa, Christos
Heywood, John S.
Sessions, John
Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Global Labor Organization (GLO)
- (wo)
-
Maastricht
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bilanakosa, Christos
- Heywood, John S.
- Sessions, John
- Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos
- Global Labor Organization (GLO)
Entstanden
- 2017
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