Arbeitspapier
Worker Reciprocity and Employer Investment in Training
Standard economic theory predicts that firms will not invest in general training and will underinvest in specific training. Empirical evidence, however, indicates that firms do invest in general training of their workers. Evidence from laboratory experiments points to less underinvestment in specific training than theory predicts. We propose a simple model in which a firm invests the socially optimal amounts in general and specific training if the worker is sufficiently motivated by reciprocity. A reciprocal worker may be willing to give the firm a full return on its investment. We present empirical evidence that supports the proposed mechanism. Workers with a high sensitivity to reciprocity have 15% higher training rates than workers with a low sensitivity to reciprocity.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 02-090/3
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Labor Contracts
- Subject
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Training
Reciprocity
Betriebliches Bildungsmanagement
Leistungsmotivation
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Leuven, Edwin
Oosterbeek, Hessel
Sloof, Randolph
van Klaveren, Chris
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2002
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Leuven, Edwin
- Oosterbeek, Hessel
- Sloof, Randolph
- van Klaveren, Chris
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2002
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Reciprocity and Emotions when Reciprocators know each other
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Negative Reciprocity and the Interaction of Emotions and Fairness Norms
Financial Globalization and Foreign Direct Investment
The (Hidden) Cost of Employer Parking Policies
Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives
Evaluating the Capacity of Standard Investment Appraisal Methods
Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace
Inherent Efficiency, Security Markets, and the Pricing of Investment Strategies
Worker Flows in Russia
Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control
Peer Evaluation: Incentives and Co-Worker Relations
Reciprocity and Emotions when Reciprocators know each other
Employee Health and Employer Incentives
Negative Reciprocity and the Interaction of Emotions and Fairness Norms
Financial Globalization and Foreign Direct Investment
The (Hidden) Cost of Employer Parking Policies
Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives
Evaluating the Capacity of Standard Investment Appraisal Methods
Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace
Inherent Efficiency, Security Markets, and the Pricing of Investment Strategies
Worker Flows in Russia
Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control
Peer Evaluation: Incentives and Co-Worker Relations
Reciprocity and Emotions when Reciprocators know each other
Employee Health and Employer Incentives
Negative Reciprocity and the Interaction of Emotions and Fairness Norms
Financial Globalization and Foreign Direct Investment
The (Hidden) Cost of Employer Parking Policies
Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives
Evaluating the Capacity of Standard Investment Appraisal Methods
Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace