Student and worker mobility under university and government competition

Arbeitspapier

We provide a normative analysis of endogenous student and worker mobility in the presence of diverging interests between universities and governments. Student mobility generates a university competition effect which induces them to overinvest in education, whereas worker mobility generates a free-rider effect for governments, who are not willing to subsidize the education of agents who will work abroad. At equilibrium, the free-rider effect always dominates the competition effect, resulting in underinvestment in human capital and overinvestment in research. This inefficiency can be corrected if a transnational transfer for mobile students is implemented. With endogenous income taxation, we show that the strength of fiscal competition increases with human capital production. Consequently, supranational policies aimed at promoting teaching quality reduce tax revenues at the expense of research.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3415

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; Educational Finance; Financial Aid ; Higher Education; Research Institutions ; Education: Government Policy
• Subject: student mobility ; worker mobility ; university competition ; government competition ; Studierende ; Auslandsaufenthalt ; Internationale Arbeitsmobilität ; Hochschule ; Standortwettbewerb ; Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik ; Institutioneller Wettbewerb ; Bildungsinvestition ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Delpierre, Matthieu ; Verheyden, Bertrand
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46428
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET