Arbeitspapier
Advertising on TV: Under- or overprovision?
We consider a model where TV channels transmit advertising, and viewers dislike such commercials. We find that the less differentiated the TV channels’ programs are, the lower is the amount of advertising in equilibrium. Relative to the social optimum, there is underprovision of advertising if TV channels are sufficiently close substitutes. In such a situation, a merger between TV channels may lead to more advertising and thus improve welfare. A publicly owned TV channel can partly correct market distortions, in some cases by having a larger amount of advertising than a private TV channel. It may actually have advertising even in cases where it is wasteful per se.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Memorandum ; No. 2005,15
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Entertainment; Media
Advertising
- Thema
-
Television industry
Advertising
Public policy
Mixed oligopoly
Fernsehwerbung
Fernsehanstalt
Medienverhalten
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kind, Hans Jarle
Nilssen, Tore
Sørgard, Lars
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Oslo, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Oslo
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kind, Hans Jarle
- Nilssen, Tore
- Sørgard, Lars
- University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2005