Arbeitspapier

Advertising on TV: Under- or overprovision?

We consider a model where TV channels transmit advertising, and viewers dislike such commercials. We find that the less differentiated the TV channels’ programs are, the lower is the amount of advertising in equilibrium. Relative to the social optimum, there is underprovision of advertising if TV channels are sufficiently close substitutes. In such a situation, a merger between TV channels may lead to more advertising and thus improve welfare. A publicly owned TV channel can partly correct market distortions, in some cases by having a larger amount of advertising than a private TV channel. It may actually have advertising even in cases where it is wasteful per se.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Memorandum ; No. 2005,15

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Entertainment; Media
Advertising
Thema
Television industry
Advertising
Public policy
Mixed oligopoly
Fernsehwerbung
Fernsehanstalt
Medienverhalten
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kind, Hans Jarle
Nilssen, Tore
Sørgard, Lars
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
(wo)
Oslo
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kind, Hans Jarle
  • Nilssen, Tore
  • Sørgard, Lars
  • University of Oslo, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2005

Ähnliche Objekte (12)