Killer acquisitions and beyond: Policy effects on innovation strategies

Arbeitspapier

This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups which serves as a foundation for the analysis of acquisition policy. We show that, in spite of countervailing incentives on incumbents and entrants, prohibiting acquisitions has a weakly negative overall innovation effect. We provide conditions determining the size of the effect and, in particular, conditions under which it is zero. We further analyze the effects of less restrictive policies, including merger remedies and the tax treatment of acquisitions and initial public offerings. Such interventions tend to prevent acquisitions only if the entrant has sufficiently high stand-alone profits.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 358

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
• Thema: innovation ; killer acquisitions ; merger policy ; potential competition ; start-ups

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Letina, Igor ; Schmutzler, Armin ; Seibel, Regina
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Zurich, Department of Economics
• (wo): Zurich
• (wann): 2023

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5167/uzh-189748
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/275661
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ