Killer acquisitions and beyond: Policy effects on innovation strategies

Arbeitspapier

This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups. We show that prohibiting killer acquisitions strictly reduces the variety of innovation projects. By contrast, we find that prohibiting other acquisitions only has a weakly negative innovation effect, and we provide conditions under which the effect is zero. Furthermore, for both killer and other acquisitions, we identify market conditions under which the innovation effect is small, so that prohibiting acquisitions to enhance competition would be justified.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 358

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
• Thema: innovation ; killer acquisitions ; merger policy ; potential competition ; start-ups

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Letina, Igor ; Schmutzler, Armin ; Seibel, Regina
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Zurich, Department of Economics
• (wo): Zurich
• (wann): 2020

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5167/uzh-189748
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/224202
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ