Konferenzbeitrag

Start-up Acquisitions and Innovation Strategies

This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups. We apply this theory to identify the effects of prohibiting start-up acquisitions. We differentiate between killer acquisitions (when the incumbent does not commercialize the acquired start-up's technology) and acquisitions with commercialization. A restrictive acquisition policy reduces the variety of research approaches pursued by the firms and thereby the probability of discovering innovations. Furthermore, it leads to strategic duplication of the entrant's innovation by the incumbent. These negative innovation effects of restrictive acquisition policy have to be weighed against the pro-competitive effects of preserving potential competition.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2020: Gender Economics

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Thema
innovation
acquisitions
mergers
competition
start-ups

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schmutzler, Armin
Letina, Igor
Seibel, Regina
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
(wo)
Kiel, Hamburg
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Beteiligte

  • Schmutzler, Armin
  • Letina, Igor
  • Seibel, Regina
  • ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Entstanden

  • 2020

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