Arbeitspapier

Interjurisdictional Spillovers, Decentralized Policymaking and the Elasticity of Capital Supply

This paper points to the important role which the elasticity of aggregate capital supply with respect to the net rate of return to capital plays for the efficiency of policymaking in a decentralized economy with mobile capital and spillovers among jurisdictions. In accordance with previous studies, we show that under the assumption of a fixed capital supply (zero capital supply elasticity) the decentralized policy choice is optimal. If the capital supply elasticity is strictly positive, however, capital tax rates are inefficiently low in the decentralized equilibrium.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3214

Classification
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
Subject
decentralized policymaking
spillovers
capital supply elasticity
Kapitalertragsteuer
Finanzföderalismus
Kapitalmobilität
Preiselastizität
Spillover-Effekt
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Eichner, Thomas
Runkel, Marco
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
09.03.2025, 5:24 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Eichner, Thomas
  • Runkel, Marco
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2010

Other Objects (12)