Imperfect Competition in the Recycling Industry

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies the market allocation in an economy where material is used for producing a consumption good, then recycled and finally landfilled, and where a recycling firm has market power. The material content constitutes an aspect of green product design and affects the recycling costs. Although the recycling firm's supply of recycling services is inefficiently low, she does not abuse her market power to distort the product design allocation. Different policy schemes are proposed which correct for market failures. One promising candidate is a relative recycling standard combined with a consumption good's tax, a material subsidy and a subsidy on recycling services.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 108-03

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
• Subject: imperfect competition ; recycling ; product design ; Kreislaufwirtschaft ; Abfallwirtschaft ; Unvollkommener Wettbewerb ; Produktdesign ; Öko-Produkt ; Steuerpolitik ; Subvention ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Eichner, Thomas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Universität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht
• (where): Siegen
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83217
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET