Arbeitspapier

Complying with the Kyoto Protocol under uncertainty: Taxes or tradable permits?

The Kyoto Protocol on climate change allocates tradable quotas to developed countries, but let them free to choose the means to respect their quota. There are good reasons for a country not to control its firms through internationally tradable permits. We thus compare a tax and purely domestic tradable permits for the European Union, the U.S and Japan. Information on abatement costs and international permit price is imperfect and stems from nine global models. Permits perform better than a tax for Japan and the U.S., whereas both instruments yield a similar outcome for Europe. Applying Weitzman (1974)'s framework in this new context, we show that these results are due to the positive correlation between costs and benefits: models that predict a low abatement cost in one country generally do so in others too, thereby forecasting a low international permit price.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 69.2002

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Water
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
Thema
Climate change
Uncertainty
Policy choice
Umweltabkommen
Ökosteuer
Emissionshandel
Vergleich
USA
EU-Staaten
Japan

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Quirion, Philippe
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Quirion, Philippe
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2002

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