Arbeitspapier
Tradable emission permits in a federal system
A system of tradable permits in the standard setting is effective in attaining the policy objective with regard to pollution reduction at the least cost. This outcome is challenged in case of a tradable permit system in a federal state with individual states having discretionary power regarding environmental policy and where pollution is transboundary across states. This paper explores the opportunities of the central authority to influence the effectiveness of the system, under different institutional arrangements, through the initial allocation of permits.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1482
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics: General
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Thema
-
tradable permits
trade bans
fiscal federalism
Emissionshandel
Finanzföderalismus
Grenzüberschreitende Umweltbelastung
Umweltpolitik
Emissionsrechte
Allokation
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Verbon, Harrie A. A.
Withagen, Cees A.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Verbon, Harrie A. A.
- Withagen, Cees A.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2005
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